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O'Farrell: Charitable Trusts

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
option to do one of two things, rather than absolutely agreeing to
do one, with a stipulation as to damages in case of his default in
granting the renewal. Consequently, it is submitted that this was
no contract calling for liquidated damages, but rather a true
alternative contract.
Much can be said for the theory contended for by Professor
Williston, for undoubtedly if the obligor performed, he would
choose the alternative most beneficial to himself. Consequently
there is reason in limiting the obligee to the value of the least
onerous alternative, for in theory this is the extent of his damage.
On the other hand, in every ordinary case where the defendant is
given option to do one of two things, he contracts to exercise the
option within a given time. Consequently, if he fails to exercise
it, he has broken his contract in its entirety, else the time provisions in such contracts would have little meaning. Should the
plaintiff be compelled to limit his damages because the defendant
has broken his contract? If we admit that by failure to exercise
his option at the agreed time the defendant has. lost the, right, and
there is considerable authority in support of this rule,10 then the
effect of (3) above would be to give him a double option, and the
same criticism could be made of (2), because he would probably
choose the least onerous, if he still retained the right of choice.
-KXNDML

H. KE-NEY.

CHARITABrxE TRUSTS.-Testator, who was seized of valuable real
estate situated in West Virginia, devised the property to a certain
banking compatiy in trust, the income to be used in educating
young men from certain counties in West Virginia and Ohio, at
Lafayette College. Held, that the devise is valid under Section
3, Chapter 57, CODEi, providing "Where any conveyance of land
has been made 0 0 1 or shall be made to trustees for the use of

10 Texas & Ry. Co. v. Marlor, 123 U. S. 687, 31 L. ed. 303, 8 Sup. Ct.
311 (1887); Rewrick v. Goldstone, 48 Cal. 554 (1874); Choice v. Mosley, 1
Bailey (S. C.) 136, 19 Am. Dec. 661 (1828); 13 C. J. 697; 6. R. C. L. 860.
In Wilson v. Lewis, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 466 (1799), the court said although
the election was lost at law, equity would relieve in a hard case.
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any college, academy, high school, or other seminary of learning,
or for the use of any society of Free Masons, Odd Fellows, or for
an orphan asylum or children's home * * * or other benevolent
association or purpose; or if without the intervention of trustees
1
such conveyance has been made 1 * * same shall be valid."
Charitable trusts received little encouragement from the early
2
Virginia and West Virginia decisions. In the leading case of
3
Gallego's Executor v. Attorney-General, the Virginia Court held
a bequest of money to be distributed among needy widows; and a
devise and bequest to be used in building a certain church, were
both void, because of indefiniteness of the beneficiaries. The court
gave as its reason, that the old statute of charitable uses (43
Eliz.) had been repealed in Virginia; therefore such charitable
trusts were subject to the ordinary rule that in order to create
a valid trust there must be a definite beneficiary; and there being
no definite beneficiary to these trusts, but rather a broad class,
the trusts must fail. It might be interesting to note that later
investigations by legal scholars demonstrated that such charitable
trusts had been enforced by the courts of equity as a part of their
inherent power, long before the passage of the statute of 43 Eliz.;
and that this statute was merely intended to provide additional
means of enforcing them. This was the basis of the opinion of
Judge Storey in the famous case of Vidal v. Gerard's Executor,'
in which the United States Supreme Court reversed its former
ruling, and held these charitable trusts enforceable without the aid
of a statute.
But in subsequent cases the Virginia court enforced the rigid
5
doctrine of the Gallego Case.' Hill's Executor v. Bowman held
that a devise and bequest of property to be used to help "any
person or persons who may be in distress" was too vague to be
enforced. Janey's Executor v. Latane7 held that a bequest to be
used for the schooling of poor white children failed. And in
Seaburn's Executor v. Seaburn,8 a bequest for the building of
churches, and the payment of ministers, shared a like fate.

, 146 S. E. 643 (1929).
Gallagher v. Gallagher, 105 W. Va.
See two previous articles on this present subject by the writer in 35
W. VA. L. QuAs., 302 and 386.
3 3 Leigh 450 (1832).
4 2 How. 127 (1844).
1

2

5 Supra, n. 2.
a 7 Leigh 657 (1836).
r 4 Leigh 327 (1833).
s 15 Grat. 423 (1859).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol35/iss4/9

2

O'Farrell: Charitable Trusts

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
The West Virginia court adopted the Virginia doctrine with
respect to charitable trusts of a religious nature. Section 1,
Chapter 57, CODE, provides that "Every conveyance of land which
shall hereafter be made for the use or benefit of any church, religious sect, society, congregation, or denomination, as a place of
-public worship, or as a burial place, or as a residence for a minister, * * * shall be valid." The court held, in the case of Knox v.
Knoxe° that the word "conveyance" used in this statute did not
include a devise, and that a devise of real estate to a church was
void. And in the case of Bible Society v. Pendieton," the
court decided that the word "conveyance" did not include a
bequest, and that a bequest of personal property for religious
purposes was void. These decisions were reaffirmed in Wilson v.
2
Perry"
and Mong v. Roushb."
Section 3, Chapter 57; CODE, respecting trusts of a non-religious
nature, provides that "Where any conveyance of land shall be
made * 0 * for the use 0 * 1 of any college, academy, high school,
or other academy of learning, or for the use of any Society of
Free Masons, Odd Fellows, 0 1 1 or for an orphan asylum or children's home 0 0 0 or for any other benevolent association or purpose * 0 * the same shall be valid." Considering the earlier decisions of the court on charitable trusts of a religious nature, it
is perhaps best that this section was not construed by the court
until 1913. By that time there had evidently been a change of
policy, for in Hays v. Harris" the court construed the word "conveyance" occurring in Section 3, Chapter 57, CODE, to include and
make valid both a devise of real property and a bequest of personal property in trust for the purposes enumerated in the statute. The court evidently disregarded both the spirit and the law
of the earlier decisions in arriving at this conclusion; but that
the result was good cannot be denied.
9 A complete list of West Virginia cases dealing with the present subject
are: Carpenter v. Mill, 3 W. Va. 174 (1869); Bible Society V. Pendleton, 7
W. Va. 79 (1873); Knox v. Knox, 9 W. Va. 124 (1876); Carskaddon v.
Torreyson, 17 W. Va. 43 (1880); Brown v. Caldwell, 23 W. Va. 187 (1883);
Mong v. Roush, 29 W. Va. 169, 1 S. E. .302 (1886); Heiskell v. Trout, 31
W. Va. 810, 8 S. E. 557 (1888); University v. Tucker, 31 W. Va. 621, 8 S.
E. 410 (1888); Wilmoth v. Wilmoth, 34 W. Va. 426, 12 S. E. 731 (1890);
Pack v. Shanklin, 43 W. Va. 304, 27 S. E. 389 (1897); Baker v. Baker, 53
W. Va. 165, 44 S. E. 174 (1902); Harris v. Neale, 61 W. Va. 1, 55 S. E.
740 (1906); Hays v. Harris, 73 W. Va. 17, 80 S. E. 827 (1913); Bank V.
Showacre, 102 W. .Va. 260, 135 S. E. 9 (1926) ; Gallagher v. Gallagher, 105
W. Va. .... , 146 S. E. 623 (1929).
10 9 W. Va. 124 (1876).
11 7 W. Va. 79 (1873).
12 29 W. Va. 169, 1 S. E. 302 (1886).
is 29 W. Va. 119, 11 S. E. 906 (1886).
14 75 W. Va. 17, 80 S. B. 827 (1913).
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So, in the recent case of Gallagherv. Gallagher,5 set forth above,
the court has continued the policy inaugurated in Hays v. Harris8
in giving the statute a broad construction, and construed
"benevolent purpose" to cover scholarships in a college. The
wording of the statute is certainly liberal, for "benevolent" has
been defined to mean "all gifts prompted by good will or kindly
feeling toward the recipient, whether an object of charity or not.
It is a word of somewhat broader, larger, and wider meaning than
charitable."'1 7 That the statute will be construed in keeping with
its liberal wording, is indicated by Gallagher v. Gallagher.'s
As the cases now stand, a devise or bequest in trust for religious
purposes is void, because the court in its earlier decisions construed
the word "conveyance" not to include a devise or bequest. But
in construing the same word in a statute relating to charitable
trusts of a non-religious nature, 9 the court in more recent decisions has arrived at an opposite result, and decided that both
devisee and bequest are included in the world "conveyance."
Quaere, if the question now came before the court as to the
validity of a devise or bequest in trust for religious purposes,
would the court adhere to its earlier decisions and declare the
trust void; or would it decide in accordance with its present
liberal views with regard to trusts of a non-religious nature?

-W.

T. 0'FARRL.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PRINCiPAL's LIABILITY FOR THE FRAUDUILENT ACT OF His AGENT-ACT SOLELY FOR TE

AGENT'S BENEFIT.

-McDonnell was an agent of the defendant railway. His duty
was, and his continuous practice had been, to give notice to consignees, including the plaintiff, of the arrival of goods. The agent,
in pursuance of a scheme of his own, notified the plaintiff of the
arrival of goods under a bill of lading and the plaintiff relying
on this notice, paid a draft. The agent had forged the bill of
lading. The plaintiff sued the railway in deceit. The Circuit
Court of Appeals followed Friedlanderv. Texas and Pacifi Rail15.Supra, n. 1.
18 Supra, n. 12.
17

7 C. J. 1141.

18 Supra, n. 1.
19 CODE, c 57, §3.
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